Does the German people exist?

 Translation from: https://gegen-kapital-und-nation.org/gibt-es-das-deutsche-volk-50f50a/

The question of what constitutes "the people" is not easily answered, because the term "the people" is used differently by both right-wing and all other political parties. Here is a brief attempt to categorize these different facets.

First, the state defines whom it treats as its people.

Whether or not someone is a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany is determined by its citizenship laws. The state defines who is automatically German, and according to which rules, or who can become German based on specific criteria upon application. These rules are also amended from time to time. Thus, it is clear: the people are a product of state power. They are a group of people whom the state defines through its laws and then claims as its own.

Their activities are intended to increase his power. The democratic state implements its program of governance through the rights it grants its citizens. It allows citizens to pursue their own interests, as long as they adhere to the limits it sets for them. As a rule, it does not explicitly prescribe what they must do. The mandate or duty is always inherent in the rights it grants them. For example, the right to do as one pleases with one's property contains the direct duty to acknowledge the property of others and their willful arbitrariness over it. Indirectly, this implies that one must strive to earn money in competition with others. This state mandate is a program of domination – private property in society is to increase. No one else in society has this objective, because private individuals are busy earning their private property from others or increasing it as capitalists. However, the state is concerned with the overall result of all activities, because a good part of its power and ability to act (taxes, creditworthiness, economic policy pressure potential against other states) is based on this.

Secondly, the people are a constant title of appeal for democratic state power.

Parliament is the people's representation, and the judiciary judges in the name of the people. The Federal President and the Federal Chancellor must take the following oath: "I swear that I will dedicate my strength to the well-being of the German people, increase their welfare, and avert harm from them […]." In this respect, the product of state power is transformed into a principal of the state. The ruler of the people is to be, at the same time, the "servant of the people."

Here it becomes more difficult to separate objectivity from delusion. First, one can simply say that it's untrue. If someone becomes Chancellor, they are not beholden to anyone on the street. It's also part of standard democratic discourse that, as an officeholder, one must not "bow to the pressure of the street."

At the same time, one could argue that the very notion of "governing by decree" against the interests of society is inherent in the concept of public service: The promise is to serve the people, not some particular interest group that makes its voice heard at demonstrations. Since capitalist society—a society that operates through competition—necessarily lacks unified economic interests, politicians can, in principle, dismiss any particular group interest by appealing to the people. After all, only a specific interest, such as that of a tenant or landlord, is being voiced, not the general interest (which is what "the people" represents).

What everyone in society needs, whether capitalist, landowner, or wage laborer, is a state authority that establishes the legal conditions for competition. This is what this "service" is all about: democratic rule obligates everyone to earn money and provides everyone equally with the legal framework to fulfill this obligation. However, the fact that wage laborers systematically draw the short straw in this system of equality is not a contradiction to the promise of equal treatment, but rather the logical consequence. Those who are disadvantaged in terms of equal treatment simply perform worse in it—just like in a referee-controlled 100-meter dash.

For the state to effectively enforce the general rules of society—both internally and externally—it must be capable of action, meaning it must be strong. The economy should flourish so that the state can derive its means of control from it. And it essentially uses its power, in turn, to keep the capitalist economy running and to promote it. This cycle of means and ends is then summarized in the program of every political party, which aims to strengthen the nation, or in this case, Germany. The "service to the people" then has the logical consequence of obligating or supporting the population in such a way that the overall result is an ever-improving national cash cow.

Thirdly, this program of domination is not only accepted by the people affected, but they identify with it.

And everyone who feels or acts German does this. In every casual discussion at the pub, the kitchen table, or the workplace, people are accustomed to discussing the most disparate topics in the name of "us." For example: "Should we increase troop numbers in Afghanistan or withdraw them?"; "Do we need more daycare places?" In practice, this way of discussing political issues is usually inconsequential. The decisions are made in parliament and by the government, and one's own opinion is irrelevant. On a more general level, however, this amateur nationalism is not without consequences: The idea that a competitive society and the state power that reigns over it are essentially a collective endeavor makes it easier for the state to implement its agenda. No form of government functions more smoothly than one to which the subjugated essentially agree because they identify with it.

Fourthly: For the sake of the idea of this invented collaborative work, the question "what is German?" receives the most peculiar answers:

Blood, genes, soil, language, culture, history, and values are said to constitute the essence of Germanness. The majority of respondents consider all these options simultaneously. In some cases, the answers are considered exclusively. All of these answers are wrong. What unites them is that they conceive of Germanness as a pre-state characteristic. The objective judgment that the only commonality among all Germans is state power over them (see the first point) contradicts the idea of a self-confident and self-evident community.

Fifth: The AfD is bringing about a new seriousness regarding the question of what the people are.

For many years, debates about what actually constitutes Germanness weren't particularly intense. Sometimes professors would argue about it in the opinion pages, but generally, it didn't matter. No one wanted to seriously pursue the debate to its conclusion. With the success of the AfD, this has changed. They claim that the other parties no longer want to serve the people at all, but rather "foreign interests." This, they argue, can be seen in current refugee, immigration, and citizenship policies. The AfD points out that only the state, through its legislation, defines who is German or allowed to reside within its territory, and can even create new Germans by changing this legal framework (easier naturalization). They see precisely in this act of state will, however, the state's greatest breach of duty. The state is essentially choosing its own people, instead of acting as a servant of a pre-state, ethnically defined collective. The AfD views the German people, as defined by the legal framework in effect until approximately 20 years ago, as a natural and pre-state entity. All Germans who have come to Germany as a result of various changes to citizenship law in the last 20 years are not considered by the AfD to be true Germans, but merely "passport Germans."

On this basis, the AfD is not simply presenting itself as a viable alternative, but rather inciting the population to rebel against the imagined dictatorship of a government that has forgotten the people and against the perceived "foreigners" within the nation. To the extent that the organized right succeeds in siphoning votes from established parties in elections and thereby organizing larger demonstrations where citizens simply denounce established politicians as traitors; to the extent that the right wing gives voice to its xenophobia, the established parties react. They themselves begin to constantly lament the precarious state of the "we" and also make the transition to propagating political "issues" in the light of the "we": The AfD is dividing society, they say, from the CSU to the Left Party. Thus, the parties no longer automatically address people only as "we" in order to then put forward any political demands. Now the "we," meaning the question of who actually belongs to the German people (point 4), is increasingly becoming a topic in the democratic public sphere. And for all sides, the goal is to finally re-establish a natural intellectual unity within the people, that is, a functioning nation (see point 3).

This text is the eleventh in the series 50 Questions 50 Answers - About the shift to the right – and how it's better not to criticize it.

After a break, we are now publishing another short analysis weekly on right-wing extremist viewpoints, poorly executed criticisms of the AfD, and key terms in the debate about the shift to the right.