From the world of science (I) The thing about the transition

If a scientist were to present the following insight as a result of his research: " Water is for washing , faleri and falera, and can also be used for brushing teeth; water is needed by the dear livestock, falera and faleri, and the fire brigade also needs water very much... and Hawaii, the South Sea island, would be a dreary palm brush." While his originality might not be questioned, his academic qualifications would certainly be challenged, and even the greatest exam pressure wouldn't prevent students from considering such material banal or nonsense. This is not the case, however, when the same academic expresses similar views about political parties. "It is the political parties that, against this backdrop, make an election decision with alternatives possible in the first place, and thus the core of a democratic process. The parties influence opinion formation and the emergence of the electorate's will with their political concepts and pronouncements; they nominate candidates for the numerous offices...; they internally condense the still unordered individual interests and opinions into political action concepts that ultimately enable generally binding decisions." Such explanations follow the pattern: "Money is when you can buy things with it; society is because otherwise everything would be in chaos; the state is where everyone wants it because they need it." They have nothing to fear in terms of laughter or even rejection, although the water song is still an honest intellectual achievement in comparison, insofar as it truly celebrates the useful functions of water, while political, socio-, psycho- and other lodges attribute beneficial functions to their respective subjects and explain them with useful effects that are not useful for those to whom this is promised, but only for the one whose actions they are claimed to have. The difficulty (even for someone who can laugh at some—not merely amusing—stupid arguments when presented separately ) of discerning this ridiculous schematism of thought in bourgeois academic practice certainly stems neither from the fact that one involves singing and the other arguing, nor from the fact that students can enjoy popular songs while having to learn and regurgitate academic themes. It is the habit of everyday, practical thinking that leads students to perceive science only as difficult, without understanding why. The scientifically disseminated diversity of imagined (and desired) effects, justified with false arguments, presents a challenge to instrumental common sense, forcing it to relinquish its entirely corresponding subjective conceptions in order to become accustomed to the transformation of the entire world into evidence for a doctrinaire subjectivism in the service of the state. It is not the effort of providing unprejudiced explanations, but rather the burden of becoming narrow-minded and regurgitating consciously partisan lines of thought, and the natural inclination to manage this within the framework and as a means of selection for a better position, that makes life difficult for students already unaccustomed to correct thinking by their schooling. The fact that all societal phenomena must be explained (and thus glorified) by their usefulness to the state, on which they know their own dependence, is so commonplace for them that, by nature, it is not the required false thinking, but correct thinking (i.e., its critique) that seems an imposition. And even if they have managed to grasp either the stupidity of bourgeois arguments or the brutal self-interest of learned scientific thought, this by no means implies the knowledge that the two belong together. In one case, they are initially nothing more than those disappointed by science who desire better arguments; in the other, they are appalled by the propagated intentions and wish to prescribe a more humane starting point for bourgeois science—in other words, friends of scientific "levels" or moralists. In this and subsequent issues of the MSZ, we will therefore demonstrate, using selected tricks of bourgeois thinking, that stupidity and brutality, error and self-interest belong together, and that one can only be overcome by encountering the other. ____________________________________________________ Throughout its long history, bourgeois science has worked its way toward condemning a single theoretical standpoint—albeit quite early on—while otherwise refusing to deny the validity of any scientific opinion. Accordingly, there is only one theory that is irrefutably correct because it has replaced the only false one: the "subjectivist theory of value" (marginal utility theory) has defeated the "objectivist" one and relegated it to the panopticon of historical monstrosities. This is somewhat surprising, as political economy is actually pecking out the eyes of its own wicked fathers: after all, it was the classical economists David Ricardo and Adam Smith who essentially devised the objectivist theory of value, and they can hardly be accused of being Marxists, even though their epigone Marx relied on them, since they were wholeheartedly committed to capitalism, fanatics of profit, and thus, from this perspective, quite above suspicion for the modern political economist. So what mistake did they make? "As a measure of this effort applicable to all goods, and simultaneously establishing their value, it was believed that the quantity of labor necessary to produce a particular good could be used. All economic values ​​were thus supposed to be expressible in quantities of labor... The price of goods tends toward their value." (Häusler) On a hot summer day: Value and weather The ancients, therefore, sought value in the objects they sold. Even the marginal utility theorist doesn't deny that these things have value—but he firmly rejects the notion that they represent "quantities of labor." This is surprising, since it's a harmless assumption that can be just as validly accepted within scientific pluralism as other, admittedly peculiar, but quite seriously held and recognized views, for example, in business cycle theory, where explanations for crises include a key capitalist's toothache or the periodicity of solar flares. However, the whole objectivist nonsense of the "labor theory of value" is rendered moot by the striking riddle. "Why, for example, can beer or ice cream be sold at significantly higher prices on a hot summer day than in bad weather... that, in general, the more goods there are, the less they cost, and that is why essential goods are plentiful and cheap for rich nations, but expensive and precious for poor nations..." (Häusler) on which the labor theory of value supposedly fails. Let's not dwell on the question of why goods cost less the more there are of them, and why they are therefore so abundant in our latitudes , so that eggs, butter, and flour are practically free (he must have the butter mountain in mind, the rascal!), but rather turn directly to the solution to this problem by the subjectivist theory of value. It has arrived at the astonishing insight that ice cream, sometimes cheaper, sometimes more expensive, has no value at all – but rather many: “We usually understand economic value to mean the significance a good has for its user. If we adopt this definition” (don’t worry, everyone does, provided they’re an economist), “it follows that the value of a good cannot be a property inherent in goods that can be objectively determined, but rather is based on the fact that the user assigns a certain value to the good. The level of value thus depends on the respective valuations of an individual, i.e., on their tastes, feelings, ideas, and inclinations. Consequently, the value of a good can only be determined subjectively and is assessed differently from individual to individual” (Häusler). This insight is so astonishing because it brazenly presents itself as such without any justification, and unperturbedly spouts all sorts of pseudo-logical if-thens, consequentlys , and therefores . Because the labor theory of value doesn't suit the marginal utility theorist, who considers it an unusual provocation, he begins with an "ordinary": common sense—the kind this gentleman enthusiastically wants to see—regards some things as dear and precious for sentimental reasons, others less so; for example, an engagement ring is more important than the same ring if it wasn't given as an engagement present. If one has so discreetly overlooked the fact that the same rings in the shop window all have the same price—a peculiar phenomenon that the marginal utility theorist doesn't notice because it doesn't suit his current agenda—and instead, different kinds of appreciation are now attached to the valuable objects with covetous eyes, it's no great feat to follow up with the assertion that the rings themselves have no value, but rather that value resides in the hearts of those wishing to marry. To demonstrate that there is no value, this troublesome question is immediately eliminated by moving on to the level of value . Since, according to what has been said so far, this level is indeterminable (the unknowable individual!), the brilliant proof of the starting point arises from returning to it, because consequently, the value of a good can only be determined subjectively. The prevailing principle here is that of arbitrariness . The scientist invents something that merely needs to somehow align with common phenomena of capitalist society in order to arbitrarily twist the phenomenon to suit his own purposes. Because people want more ice cream when the sun is shining, ice cream doesn't have a single value, but rather its value exists in manifold ways in the minds of the buyers. With this, science would have abdicated its responsibility to economics, and all questions about value would have dissolved into astonishment at the unfathomable whims of individual will. The logic of the optimum point That this is nonsense, albeit with a very specific purpose, and not the result of scientific thinking, is demonstrated by economics itself when—by no means contemplating its own abdication—it now gives people precise instructions on how to handle their valuations, thus refusing to accept that buyers/sellers are always economically right, no matter what they do. It devises the indifference curve system (for reassurance: knowledge of this system is absolutely unnecessary for understanding economics) and finds within it an "optimal point" for every utility-minded individual; this optimal point arises from something quite contrary to subjective arbitrariness: the individual compares their income with the prices of goods and considers which and how many goods they must buy and which they must forgo , thus submitting to the dictates of their limited income and prices. The first tenet of economics, therefore, does not concern itself with the question of where the wealth of nations comes from (as the ancients did), but speaks of the "scarcity" of all goods, which is contrasted by the unlimited value of their worth, neatly summarized in the tenet that the good most highly valued is that which one cannot possess. The marginal utility theory expresses the constraints inherent in income and prices as the logic of the optimum point—according to which, for example, it is absurd to divide one's money between bread and cigarettes in such a way as to consume only cigarettes, even though this is entirely a matter of individual choice—thus presupposing the low income that is consumed by prices—and simultaneously acting as if, in the act of purchasing, a person always attains heaven on earth, precisely because they realize the individual value of the good for themselves at that moment. Subjectivist proof: otherwise, they wouldn't buy/sell it. "It's understandable that a housewife might get upset because she saw the same blouse she bought yesterday in another shop window today for a significantly lower price... but" (the silly goose is quite mistaken about her own self-esteem) "she made the purchase because it seemed advantageous to her at the moment of purchase. Why else would she have exchanged it?" (Häusler) This line of reasoning takes on a grotesque exaggeration in the case of Häusler, quoted here: "Usually, when a person desires to acquire certain goods, they are faced with two options: either to produce these goods themselves or to generate other goods and services in order to acquire the means to purchase the desired goods. Thus, there is a direct and an indirect path to this goal (Chinese proverb)." (Häusler) Imagine: a car-loving proletarian doesn't go to the factory in the morning, but to his garden shed, where he builds himself a Volkswagen with great pleasure – only to realize afterwards that he hadn't paid attention somewhere in his consideration of utility. What if The principle revealed here, namely to simply deny the objective necessities of capitalist society and transform them into expedients that arise harmoniously from the will of the people (in Häusler's view, the proletarian naturally realizes that it is much more satisfying for him to go to the factory in the morning because he can then buy more cars), reveals that these necessities are not a pleasant matter, which is why the political economist, on the one hand, upholds them as unconditional, and on the other hand, always emphasizes their happiness-bringing and humane character. To this end, he always comes up with the same arguments following the pattern – what if this or that didn't exist – You can tell how great something is by the fact that it works. This can be done, for example, by asking about the nature of money and then imagining money away: the terrible difficulties of bartering in kind prompt one to immediately return to a monetary economy, thus proving that one can exchange more easily with money (which was already clear when one considered a barter economy), therefore a monetary economy is excellent. Even more successful is the argument when it comes to prices: on the one hand, they arise from subjective valuations, and on the other hand, they regulate these valuations, a beautiful tautology (supply and demand determine prices, prices regulate supply and demand) which is therefore not a scientific problem at all; on the contrary, it is the pinnacle of scientific progress because competition is such an excellently functioning mechanism. "The conflict is resolved and the interests balanced through prices. They result from the interaction of supply and demand..." (Häusler) "The competitive order is an ingenious mechanism that, through a framework of markets and prices, unintentionally combines and coordinates the knowledge and actions of millions of different economic agents. Without a thinking and directing central brain, this economic order solves one of the most difficult mathematical problems: a system encompassing several thousand unknown variables and equations. No one invented it; it simply evolved. And just like human nature, it is subject to changes and fluctuations from time to time; nevertheless, it passes the fundamental test of any social order: it is viable." (Samuelson) The reasons why it is urgently necessary to congratulate our economic system are expressed by economics itself in its pursuit of excellence: "Although buying and selling must be necessary and self-evident attributes of a market economy" (remember that, man!), "many people still associate the terms 'buying' and 'selling' with the idea of ​​enrichment or exploitation. They have probably had occasional bad experiences as market participants... Again, we must remember that our theoretical considerations generally assume rational behavior... Therefore, economic theory generally assumes that buying, selling, and exchanging on a voluntary basis only occur because both parties feel richer through the exchange . " (The occasional bad experiences are thus due to an upset stomach...) "They value the goods they receive more highly than what they give in return." (Häusler) The obvious fact that all this bartering does not lead to everyone constantly winning is acknowledged by the subjective theory of value itself in that it does indeed take into account the objective conditions of exchange (income, prices, value), but only in order to transform them into psychology – which, however, must in turn only be guided by these objective conditions. What must not be Marginal utility theory reduces itself to its core in such remarks: “Marx sought the way out” (of the errors of the labor theory of value) “in exploitation.” The denial of surplus value is, after all, the ultimate goal, and that is the purpose of this entire event. The fact that commodities have value, and that in the exchange of these commodities only those who had them produced profit, while those who produced them remain equally poor—that is, that surplus value arises in the production of commodities that does not belong to those who produce them—this fact must not be true. In its utterly intolerant refutation of the labor theory of value, political economy must therefore be radically opposed to its own classical economists, who had indeed recognized value and surplus value and did not subscribe to nonsensical notions such as: that surplus value arises from all buyers and sellers cheating each other, thereby making everyone richer. They possessed this insight because they were interested in the establishment of capitalism and therefore in understanding its laws, including exploitation. They regressed from their insights and transformed themselves into apologists precisely because their concern was the establishment of capitalism ; they did not want to progress toward its critique. They became apologists even though, and precisely because, they sensed that this system is not harmonious but crisis-ridden, that capitalist wealth accumulation includes the constant destruction of wealth, and that productivity gains only occur under the dictates of profit and the increased exploitation of surplus labor—that is, only conditionally. Another thinker took this further. The transition to departure On the other hand, political economy—from the standpoint of established capitalism—is radically opposed to science, negating science altogether, and in this, sitting directly at the heart of bourgeois society, it is the first bourgeois science. It presents society's fundamental principle in its purest form: not that the determinations of a thing arise from it, i.e., from its investigation—and the systematic derivation of one determination from another is called a transition—but rather that thought must be guided by an interest external to this thing, by the interest in the preservation and glorification of this society. Therefore, it is entirely irrelevant that the refutation of the labor theory of value is and can never be completely false; what matters is that science proves itself entirely in its apologetic function. For this, it can completely dispense with anything like a transition, having already completed it long ago by turning away from science.   From: MSZ 22 – April 1978