A critique of university relativism
(Translation of https://www.gegen-kapital-und-nation.org/wahrheit-gibts-nicht-das-kann-doch-wohl-nicht-wahr-sein/)
The bourgeois humanities: against arbitrariness and objectivity at the same time
In addition to the hope of better career prospects, scientific interest plays a role for some prospective students in their decision to go to university and in their choice of subject. What they have learned at school or acquired privately is not enough; they want to deepen their knowledge, have unanswered questions that they want to pursue in more detail. One person has always been enthusiastic about geophysics and perhaps associates his studies with the hope of being able to help people in the event of a tsunami using early warning systems. The same applies to the anti-fascist who expects a sociology degree to provide better answers to the question of why fascist ideas simply refuse to die out. But even those who have chosen the subject purely for career reasons or simply because they have done best in the field in terms of grades so far can tell their friends and acquaintances a lot about the social benefits of the respective scientific degree. They all consider deepening knowledge and understanding subjects through study to be an important means of solving any problem.
In the courses and homework, what was introduced in the upper grades is actually continued: a mere "I think this or that is stupid" or "I think the CDU/SPD are uncool" as a contribution to any debate is no longer acceptable. This would only be a subjective or particular point of view and has no place in academic discussion. So you have to justify, argue, give reasons, etc.
In the humanities, however, you must not overdo objectivity. In addition to dealing with individual topics and theories, one teaching content is always present: the desire to find out something is right; to believe that this is possible is a mistake.
Almost all books by professors and doctors - scientists after all, who have studied for around five years and then worked intensively on a topic for around four years - emphasize in the introduction and conclusion that all knowledge is on very shaky ground:
The introduction explains in detail that the profession is completely at odds with each other on the key concepts. But this is usually not the first step in discussing the contradictory approaches, putting the wrong ones in the garbage bin and the right ones in the pot. As a rule, one simply decides on a definition of the term. "I'm sticking to so-and-so's approach because it seems more productive to me" is a common transition in a scientific paper and is not rejected with the accusation that science is not a matter of preference.
In the final part of the paper, it is emphasized that the results obtained are of a preliminary nature and, in principle, one is encouraged to raise further questions.
It is one thing that some subjects are really difficult to explain. It is neither abnormal that one has to think about certain subjects for more than ten years, nor is it abnormal that one asks other scientists for help, along the lines of: "I have a problem here, I'm not getting anywhere with it, maybe someone else can?" It is also possible to find good and poor arguments from different authors. But if all the results are subject to reservation, then one can rightly ask what remains of the desire to get help in solving certain problems by studying the things. Or, to put it more simply: what is the point of all this?
It is also noticeable that this pluralism of theories, all of which are in principle subject to reservation, is reserved primarily for the humanities. Textbooks on the natural sciences do not always contain a reference to the provisional nature of their results. Of course, there are open questions here too that scientists are still working on, but not all the laws of physics are prefaced with the word "everything is pretty uncertain".
I know that I know nothing
In the theory of science, the impossibility of knowledge is "proven" separately from the individual sciences. Philosophy "shows" that thinking is not enough to explain things. Linguistics has "proven" that language is an imperfect thing. Because of the resulting poor communication and poor reading comprehension, people cannot form an objective concept of the objects being discussed.
This "proof" contains a fundamental contradiction that reduces all the considerations of the theory of science to absurdity: They claim to know that knowledge is not possible. And they think that is right! The same contradiction is also present in linguistics: Many representatives consider language to be a very imperfect thing and tell us this in books and speeches from the professor's desk. Even if linguists quote, criticize and praise each other in their books about the imperfection of language, in this practice they express that they assume that they are understood and that they have understood the others.
The basic principle in the humanities faculties is that knowledge is not enough. Anyone who comes to the university and says that they have understood something and can show that the differing theories are wrong will make themselves very unpopular with lecturers and fellow students. Accusations of dogmatism follow immediately and they are excluded from further discussions. Scientists are expected to be modest and only on this basis can they continue to argue with verve about open questions.
You can see where this leads
The desired modesty is not only contradictorily justified in the "Epistemology" section, as shown above, but is also demanded with reference to the alleged practical consequences: For example, the debate rarely fails to mention that Marxism-Leninism, with its claim to truth, has produced many victims in its real existing systems. Left and right scientists try to show, by referring to real socialism, that the claim to have objective knowledge leads to barbarism.
But it is one thing to discuss the economic system in the former Soviet Union, its foreign policy or the way it deals with political opponents. This substantive discussion (which also sometimes occurs alongside the accusation of dogmatism) is simply ignored with the above-mentioned embarrassment technique. The criticism is simply abstract, that the real socialists were completely convinced of the things they did.
Nor is the criticism directed against "dialectical materialism" (Diamat), with which the real socialists have cobbled together a worldview that they believe must be adopted before any scientific discussion. They were certain before any further discussion that history would inevitably push towards socialism or communism, "a result of the application of Diamat to history". They have made a prejudice the duty of any further science and social discussion, which is actually anti-scientific. But that is not what is meant when the former and current remnants of Marxist-Leninists are accused of dogmatism. The fact that they were at all sure what was right for the USSR is a thorn in the side of the bourgeois critics. This is how the bourgeois critics explain the violence of the Soviet state against its citizens. But if one were to assume that objective knowledge about the subject of discussion is the necessary prerequisite for reasonable action, then this conviction would not result in violent action against those who think differently about the subject. Because if it were about the right argument, a substantive debate with differing opinions would be necessary, not their violent suppression. You cannot refute an argument with violence.
Postmodernism: Skepticism as Enlightenment
Denying that knowledge is even possible is, oddly enough, particularly popular in critical scientific circles. Cultural studies have a number of objections to attempts in biology or medicine to use speculative analogies to explain all kinds of social behavior in human nature. The idea that intelligence has something to do with races, which can supposedly be scientifically determined using knowledge of genes, is now again socially acceptable and is rightly considered by critics to be an ideology. But their attack on the biologization of social issues does not stop at criticizing the prejudiced design of the experiments or their far-reaching, erroneous conclusions from the meager knowledge of genes. Their "attack" on false consciousness, not only in the natural sciences but in society in general, is much more fundamental. What they criticize about prejudices is not the false judgments, but rather outright claim that judgment itself, the act of being certain about something, is the central problem. It is "deconstructed" as much as possible. No idea lasts, no fact can be taken for granted. They consider skepticism, the fundamental doubt about everything, to be a scientifically enlightened program.(1)
On the other hand, for those who really want to change something, it must be said that actions that are not based on knowledge lead to nothing at best. If a large bridge is to be built and there is no knowledge of the laws of statics, then the laws of nature will prevail over the bridge builders - the bridge will collapse. The same applies to political action. Anyone who has no concept of right-wing extremists, has thoroughly analyzed the thoughts of fascists and therefore knows their social foundations, will at best fight symptoms, but make no contribution to stopping the crap. And anyone who immediately thinks that we should stop political action because everything is uncertain will have to continue to watch as the state and capital achieve their goals.
Bourgeois science - modest and resolutely in favor of power
Despite all the questioning of their results, humanities scholars generally still consider themselves to be "closer to the truth" than all those who do not deal with their subjects so intensively. Nevertheless, the social rules are made by others, the politicians. It is striking that this group of people does not hesitate to draw practical conclusions from their considerations.
Apparently, two different standards apply to science and politics: some seek the truth without presuming to accept the results as correct and thus demand consequences. Others act and draw consequences without having to know the truth. When a chancellor begins his assessment of the situation and the resulting political consequences with an "I think" or "I feel", the opinion also has a completely different meaning. Someone, equipped with executive powers, is setting the new line for everyone else along which they must present their objections and wishes if they still want to be taken into account in any way - not a trace of modesty.
By cultivating the practice of relativism in the humanities, this relationship is affirmed. For most scientists, this relationship is also simply the reason for their relativism. They are modest because they like this division of labor in democratic rule. Scientists continue to write their criticisms and constructive suggestions in the so-called ivory tower, separated from politics, or at the invitation of politics in expert committees. Politics then selects the scientific "results" that they believe will advance the position. And so democracies produce their poor people and wars, but that is forgivable - after all, even a politician cannot know everything...
On a personal note,
Jimmy Boyle unfortunately does not have a monopoly on the truth either. But we do believe that what is written in this and other leaflets about universities, the welfare state, wage labor, war, etc. is correct. At least no one has yet presented us with any plausible counter-arguments. So if we are on the wrong track on an issue, we naturally always hope that someone will dissuade us by criticizing us. Otherwise, we naturally remain immodest and defend our positions and arguments in the hope that others are not in the mood for humility either, but are interested in explaining and abolishing poverty and other misery.
(1) This left-wing history of science is well known to its advocates: In his book on discourse economics, Hartmut Winkler gives a very good account of the initial question and the path of cultural studies: 1. Wondering why people are not open to left-wing ideas. 2. Believing that it is due to entrenched basic ideas that seem natural to people. 3. Then, in contrast, pursuing scientific and linguistic theory that is supposed to show that every sign is of a historical nature. FaM 2004, p. 210.
This text was published in the summer of 2007 in connection with the university brochure "Texts against the academic world" by the group jimmy boyle. You can download the brochure here as a pdf[195kb] .
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