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Hegel on science, knowledge, objectivity

 Here is a passage from Hegel's philosophy of religion, in which one can see where Marxism found its inspiration for its atheism and naturalism, and also perhaps where the idea of a logical derivation of the state or capital came from:


"Knowledge so far aims at that which *is*, and the *necessity* of it, and apprehends this in the relation of cause and effect, reason and result, power and manifestation; in the relation of the Universal, of the species and the individual existing things which are included in the sphere of contingency. Knowledge, science, in this manner places the manifold material in mutual relations, takes away from it the contingency which it has through its immediacy, and while contemplating the relations which belong to the wealth of finite phenomena, encloses the world of finiteness in itself so as to form a system of the universe, of such a kind that knowledge requires nothing for this system outside of the system itself. For what a thing is, what it is in its essential determinate character, is disclosed when it is perceived and made the subject of observation. From the constitution of things, we proceed to their connections in which they stand in relation to an Other; not however, in an accidental, but in a determinate relation, and in which they point back to the original source from which they are a deduction. 


This we inquire after the reasons and causes of things; and the meaning of inquiry here is, that what is desired is to know the *special* causes. Thus it is no longer sufficient to speak of God as the cause of the lightning, or the downfall of the Republican system of government in Rome, or of the French Revolution; here it is perceived that this cause is only an entirely general one, and does not yield the desired explanation. What we wish to know regarding a natural phenomenon, or regarding this or that law as effect or result, is, the reason as the reason of this particular phenomenon, that is to say, not the reason which applies to all things, but only and exclusively to this definite thing. And thus the reason must be that of such special phenomena, and such reason or ground must be the most immediate, must be sought and laid hold of in the *finite*, and must itself be a finite one. 


Therefore this knowledge does not go above or beyond the sphere of the finite, nor does it desire to do so, since it is able to apprehend all in its finite sphere, is conversant with everything, and knows its course of action. In this manner science forms a universe of knowledge, to which God is not necessary, which lies outside of religion, and has absolutely nothing to do with it. In this kingdom, knowledge spreads itself out in its relations and connections, and in so doing has all determinate material and content on its side; and for the other side, the side of the infinite and the eternal, nothing whatever is left."


(Philosophy of religion, Vol 1, p. 13-14)


Of course, the trouble: Hegel is saying that this is one side: the objective materialistic-scientific side, which itself grew out of an opposition within an originally religious attitude (work week vs Sunday of religious contemplation). This materialist-scientific-knowledge side eventually turned into an opposition to the religious-idealist-spiritual-faith side. So, knowledge of the material world is at odds with a religious attitude about the infinite, the eternal, the absolute, God. And Hegel's project was to reconcile and correct both sides of these on his project of objective or absolute idealism.


Hegel doesn't just leave it at the objectivity of knowledge, but still insists that the objectivity of knowledge must overall have a ground, an absolute upon which it rests, still a higher justification. And all this after making some incredibly trenchant criticisms of religious idealism, of pointing out the stupidity of searching for an absolute-universal singular reason or standpoint from which to account for everything, Being as a whole. His criticisms of religion and idealism can be boiled down to: a reason for everything explains nothing. But then he wants to use this to criticize materialism.

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