Notes on Heidegger's Being and Time

Heidegger discusses four different ways in which the word “world” has been used. The first definition is that of traditional philosophy, “'World' is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world” (BT 93/65). Traditional philosophy has only investigated the present-at-hand objects within the world. They view the world as a set of undifferentiated things – matter or stuff -- situated within objective space.  By present-at-hand, Heidegger means objects that are immediately present to consciousness. Put more abstrusely: specific equipment or tools which have been yanked (de-worlded) from the totality of equipment and thus become self-contained or looked at in isolation by Dasein (human beings). In the present-at-hand mode of Being, equipment remains unused during observation. By observing the present-at-hand Dasein inevitably enters into a detached theoretical/philosophical/scientific mode of Being. Think the scientist who just neutrally observes by staring and watching what an object does. 

            Traditionally philosophy conceptualized space as a system of physical distance: light years, inches, feet, etc. Human beings were depicted as existing within a box-like universe populated by a system of objects or aggregate of things. Humans interact with objects and other humans in a three dimensional world. Dasein experiences itself as distinct and separate from the world and others. The way of viewing the world relies upon the conception of substantatility that takes the world as consisting of an internal (subjective, mind) and external (objective, world) – thus leading to a pseudo-problem of how the internal (human subjectivity) is able to interact and truly comprehend the external world. Entities have a common empirical features; this however does not constitute the essence of the world. By accepting the subject/object dichotomy, philosophy necessarily ignores the question of Being in general; it ignores the ontological, and focuses on the ontic.

            Starting with entities, as opposed to Being, led philosophers to adopt a subject/object mode of viewing the world, because of this the being of the world is presupposed before investigation of the world begins. According to Heidegger, ontologically Dasein does not experience the world as present-at-hand, i.e. in a detached, theoretical manner. Phenomenologically Dasein is not located in space-time, grappling with objects in mere thought only. Heidegger dismisses traditional philosophy's view of the world. Dasein's primary relation to the world is one of use, not just thinking about physical objects distinct from Dasein. 

             What briefly shows itself is the structure of presence-at-hand, which philosophy has failed to grasp. Heidegger points to the inherent structural or methodological problem of  theoretical observation when he states,

No matter how sharply we just look at the ‘outward appearance’ of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand.  If we look at things just ‘theoretically,’ we can get along without understanding readiness to hand. (BT 98/69).

            Heidegger is able to capture the phenomena ignored by other philosophers by giving a phenomenological description of the world. By investigating the ready-to-hand Heidegger points out that that which is closest is ontologically furthest away. For instance, one's glasses are ontically close, yet one never even takes note of them unless they malfunction by breaking or digging into the skin. What briefly shows itself is the structure of presence-at-hand. One quickly notices that Heidegger does not talk about subjects or minds, but of Dasein. The world and Dasein are a unified whole, both are inseparably merged together. When one is playing baseball, for example, it is almost as if the glove is indistinguishable from Dasein. In the experience of catching the ball, one does not think of the glove as an entity apart from the body, but as an extension of the whole. Equipment and Dasein come together forming an undifferentiated mass, the experience of playing baseball.

            Heidegger refers to Dasein's engaged interactions with the world as “dealings.” Heidegger points out that humans live in the world and experience the world as familiar. Dasein's familiarity with the world is with places. By places, it is meant an area or space (not in the physical sense) which Dasein feels a sense of ownership and concern towards the world. Dasein is familiar with the world, it knows its way around it. The world, in this sense, is a concrete experiential context -- as opposed to a physical-spatial context -- wherein Dasein is immersed or surrounded. In other words, Dasein's concernful interaction with the entities in the world is characterized by the fact that the objects in the world matter to Dasein. For instance, while watching a movie one cares about being in an environment conducive to viewing a film: dimmed lights, a comfortable seat, etc. These entities matter, they have significance for Dasein; however, the reverse is not true. A chair does not posses and sense of ownership, nor does it care about the aura of the room. Entities do not do anything by themselves: they don't act upon the world, nor do they have a sense of concern for the world or a sense of  “mineness.”Equipment merely sits idle, unless Dasein engages with it.

            Dasein's engagement with equipment is purposeful; this points to the nature of equipment as ready-to-hand. All equipment is used for  a purpose, or a “for-the-sake-of-which.” One important feature of readiness-to-hand (the type of being which belongs to equipment) is that it withdraws.  During use, the tool itself withdraws from our thematic observation, our awareness. Tools do not withdraw when being observed, when not in use. All equipment works this way. When one has mastery of his tools, and uses them in a familiar or comfortable setting, the tools fade, or in other words, just by beholding equipment, one looses thematic awareness of the entity in use. The ready-to-hand is inconspicuous. 

            In moments of breakdown the ready-to-hand allows Heidegger to uncover three intermediate modes of being: conspicuousness (unready-to-hand, when something breaks), obtrusiveness (when something goes missing), and obstinacy (when another concern diverts our attention away from our dealings with the ready-to-hand). These modes signify when the ready-to-hand becomes unusable.  When an entity is needed, but is missing our awareness is heightened and focused on the absence. This is one way in which the world “lights” up to Dasein. By investigating these intermediate modes of being, one is able to notice an entities relation to the equipmental whole. The ready-to-hand becomes unready-to-hand (an intermediate mode of being, where the tool is still seen as a tool, but one is aware of  its connections and properties, how the tool is connected to the world). Whereas the ready-to-hand usually withdraws, a damaged unready-to-hand tool is in need of repair. One must know a tool's “in order to” in order to fix it.  Once a tool is repaired, one inevitably views the object as withdrawn and ready-to-hand. 

When philosophers analyze the present-at-hand, they aren't capturing the way the world really is. “Theoretical behavior is just looking, without circumspection” (BT 99/70). In contrast to the present-at-hand, Heidegger coins the term ready-to-hand, which he believes is the real mode in which the vast majority of equipment functions in Dasein's everyday experience. When entities are ready-to-hand, they withdraw from one's awareness. If one wants to study an entity, one must stop using it, remove it from its totality, and put it on the observation table. At this point, though, Dasein is acting in a fundamentally different manner, or mode of Being; Dasein is in a theoretical observation mode. When Dasein switches over to that mode, the ready-at-hand entities to be examined change over into a present-at-hand object. The entities become inert and sit there.

Philosophy must operate at this level because, by definition, it is a matter of thinking and examining. The manner in which we examine an entity changes the the very entity we examine. One cannot stare at and study a ready-to-hand tool because as soon as it look at it in this mode, the tool ceases to be a tool. The experience of the drill in a carpenter's hand as he is drilling, when he is not focusing on it at all (routine action) is completely different from simply staring at it. Philosophers attempt to examine nature as it really is, but the way they examine the world changes the reality which is being examined -- it must necessarily deprive itself of the ready-to-hand. The tools only are what they are during use, but that is when we cannot have thematic awareness. As soon as we start paying attention to the tools they stop being what they are.

            When this happens the ready-to-hand equipment changes its mode of being. The ready-to-hand becomes unready-to-hand (an intermediate mode of being, where the tool is still seen as a tool, but one is aware of  its connections and properties, how the tool is connected to the world). Whereas the ready-to-hand usually withdraws, a damaged unready-to-hand tool is in need of repair. One must know a tool's “in order to” in order to fix it.  Once a tool is repaired, one inevitably views the object as withdrawn and ready-to-hand. 

            One quickly notices that Heidegger does not talk about subjects or minds, but of Dasein and its interconnectedness to the world. The world and Dasein are a unified whole, both are inseparably merged together. When one is playing baseball, for example, it is almost as if the glove is indistinguishable from Dasein. In the experience of catching the ball, one does not think of the glove as an entity apart from the body, but as an extension of the whole. Equipment and Dasein come together forming an undifferentiated mass, the experience of playing baseball. Heidegger's approach is holistic. Dasein does not come across individual entities when engaged in its dealings. Phenomenologically the totality comes first metaphysically and experientially. Entities could not be the equipment they are without being seen in connection and conjunction with the whole of the Being of the totality of the world. Dasein does not perceive entities individually, but as a whole. Heidegger argues that, “there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is” (BT 97/69). There can never be a piece of equipment totally isolated, torn from its relation to the totality of other equipment. To illustrate this concept, it is useful to think of a steel mill: miles of equipment cooperating and meshing together, being used by workers who create the commodity steel. All of the entities in the mill belong together. A centrifugal roll sleeve caster would be inconceivable – indeed, its purpose would be rendered incoherent --  without the totality of other associated machinery used in steel production. 

            Dasein ascribes certain normative roles, functions, and behaviors to equipment. Equipment can be used incorrectly; for example, one would not use an axle assembly line to produce yarn, nor could a spinning jenny be used to produce tires. Dasein builds tools whose behavior fits the purpose of the tool. A bucket is used to carry liquids or other materials, not to stir a bowl of soup.

            The “towards-which” signifies a mode of Being which an entity or Dasein moves towards, its aim and direction (not in a traditional spatial sense). For instance, the towards-which of a shovel is to dig a ditch, a piano to produce sound. The “towards-which” of a specific Dasein might be to become a well-known composer. Everything that exists must have something which it aims at, that it moves towards. The “towards-which” always has an anatomy, structure, or design of this mode of being.  The spinning jenny's “towards-which” is to transform wool into yarn; the yarn, in turn, will be turned a coat, which is equipment for Dasein. The “towards-which” has the same mode of being as the thing producing it; it is merely a tool used in making another tool. The “towards-which” is also ready-to-hand. 

            We can only do this in the context of activities and equipment. Dasein is a manifesting of sorts; Dasein  lives its way of being in tools or equipment. Being-in-the-world, one is in the world by performing or embodying certain roles. The world is just the totalities of all of these chains of equipment. The worldhood is chains of use. One gets absorbed into these. Dasein is absorbed into the world, like ink into a blotter. The ink is still there, but it is in the fabric of the blotter or cloth.

Works cited:

Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. New York: Harper Publishing Company, 1962.