Stanley
Rosen argues in the Prologue of his book, Plato's Sophist: The Drama of
Original and Image, that there are essentially two contrasting approaches
to Plato's dialogues: the dramatic and ontological. The dramatic perspective,
according to Rosen, “regards the
dialogue as a unity, and more specifically, as a work of art in which the
natures of the speakers, as well as the circumstances under which they
converse, all play a part in the doctrine of philosophical significance of the
text” (Rosen 1). The reason for adopting this approach is due to the “dialogue
form itself” (Rosen 1). The dramatic perspective finds that something important
is missing when Plato's dialogues are cut asunder into propositional fragments,
and reduced to technical and philosophical statements that are then understood
in an ad hoc fashion. It is upheld, by those who ascribe to the dramatic
reading, that these technical propositions (the content) only make sense if
they are located within the organic dialogue as a whole (the form).
In
contrast to the dramatic perspective, the ontological perspective is
concerned explicitly with the technical and philosophical content of Plato's dialogues.
The ontological approach to Plato's texts is concerned with outlining a theory
of “being” (in varying meanings of the term) that can be found in Plato's
writings. Rosen argues that the ontological perspective in not concerned with
the “dramatic, mythical, or 'literary' elements in the dialogue” (Rosen 3). The
ontological perspective distinguishes between philosophy and poetry (the
ontological and ontic), and sees philosophy as a science. Hegel's
interpretation of Plato's dialogues cuts across the distinction laid out by
Rosen in many important respects; however, it would seem that Hegel's reading
of Plato is closest to the ontological perspective. First, I will give a
general overview of Hegel's reading of the Platonic dialogues, and then his
exegesis of Plato's Sophist.
Hegel’s
reading of Plato puts forth a unitary view of the dialogues, but not so
much in relation to their dramatic sequence. Rather, Hegel sees a unity
in terms of the overarching philosophical concerns that weave the most important
dialogues together: the possibility of speculative philosophy. For Hegel, the Theaetetus and the Sophist can be
understood as dialogues inaugurating what the Eleatic Stranger calls “the
business of dialectics,” by criticizing and synthesizing the two schools of
Heraclitus and Parmenides. Each of these two schools seriously limit the
capacity to understand reality. Each groups respective metaphysics result in,
what Hegel calls, “the pure nights of Being and Becoming.” It is Hegel's belief
that the greatness of Plato consists is his philosophical attempt to
dialectically unify the two opposing schools into a more comprehensive and
deeper system that upholds what was living in both, and discards what was dead.
In Plato, a discourse is made possible that does not end in the blinding pure
light of Parmenidean Being or in the ineffable darkness of Heraclitean
Becoming. Therefore, the advance Plato makes is to integrate becoming into
speculative discourse, as understood from the primacy of “The Idea,” where change
and flux can only be thought through higher levels of conceptual determination.
It is Plato, with the exception of Aristotle, that most clearly for Hegel,
anticipates the “absolute Idea.” Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this
paper to really go in depth into Hegel's discussion of the Theaetetus or
Heraclitean Becoming. Thus, the following exegesis will necessarily be a bit
one-sided, as it will mainly focus on the Sophist and Parmenidean Being.
Hegel
starts off his lecture on Plato's Sophist by telling us that Plato
“investigated the pure Notions or Ideas of movement and rest, self-identity and
other-being, Being and non-being” (62). In other words, Plato is interested in
some of the basic questions of ontology and metaphysics. By “pure Notions or
Ideas,” Hegel simply means that Plato is not interested in the empirical
content that can be grasped through the senses, but rather in the thought or
concept itself. The word “pure” means that Plato is dealing with abstractions,
that leave aside the messiness of the empirical world. Hegel tells us, “Plato
expresses in the Sophist a clearer consciousness of Ideas as abstract
universalities” (62). For example, Plato is not going to talk about any particular
tree, but the concept of tree, and all the features that are common
(universal) between each different tree. Hegel argues that in the Sophist,
Plato refutes Parmenides by proving “that non-being is, and likewise that the
simple self-identical partakes of other-being, and unity of multiplicity” (62).
To put it differently: “A” is not simply “A.” Rather, actually contains all
other determinations within it. “A” is also “not P.”
Hegel is not particularly interested in matters of
literary authenticity of the dialogues as was Schleiermacher, and is content to
rely on the authority of the ancients, who took the most profound dialogues as
written by Plato. More important than matters of authenticity, Hegel wants to
read the most important dialogues from the perspective of speculative
philosophy that Plato commences.
Hegel,
in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, anticipates the Straussian
hermeneutical readings of the Platonic dialogues. The followers of Leo Strauss
take the meaning of Plato's dialogues to be functioning on two levels: exoteric
and esoteric. Hegel thinks it is completely nonsensical and fantastic that any
philosopher would be able to hide the truths of their philosophy as they would
tangible external goods. Hegel criticizes the esoteric/exoteric readings of
Plato when he writes, “the distinction is doubtless an unwarranted one,
indicating... that Plato could have two such philosophies-- one for the world,
for the people, and the other, the inward, reserved for the initiated. But the
esoteric is the speculative, which, even though written and printed, is yet, without
being any secret, hidden from those who have not sufficient interest in it
to exert themselves” (68). The speculative Idea that Plato introduces,
according to Hegel, is of a completely different nature than an object someone
can hide away.
Hegel
would contend that esotericism is mistaken, perhaps for the following reason,
which he expresses in the concluding lines of his inaugural address to
his students attending his lecture series, “Man, because he is Mind, should and
must deem himself worthy of the highest; he cannot think too highly of the
greatness and power of his mind, and with this belief, nothing will be so
difficult and hard that it will not reveal itself to him” (xiii). Thus, if
Hegel is correct, it is not as some Straussians imagine, that there are a
special ilk of man (the initiated philosopher) who can withstand the harsh
truth, and must guard the truth carefully by passing the true esoteric
interpretation down the the elite initiated few, and fabricate exoteric
myths (noble lies) for the masses of normal uninitiated people. Rather, anyone
who shows a steady devotion and dedication, and who trusts in their ability
gain genuine knowledge, may gain access to the Truth expressed in philosophy.
The
communication of an idea might require some “esoteric” skill, but it is not,
according to Hegel, fundamental to how we should understand the ideas
themselves. For Hegel, we can see the philosophy of Plato clearly expressed in
the dialogues through the process of examination. Albeit, we may grasp the
truth expressed in the dialogues only if we read the conversations as a whole.
Hegel writes, “The Being of the universe, at first hidden and concealed, has no
power which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; it has to lay
itself open before the seeker-- to set before his eyes and give for his
enjoyment, its riches and its depths” (xiii). Thus, it seems, the only
prerequisites to grasping the truth of the dialogues is 1) the ability to read,
2) an interest in the text, and 3) the ability to work hard at understanding
the text.
For
Hegel, Plato’s absence from the dialogues does not create much of a mystery
either, since by his mode of “putting his thoughts always in the mouth of
others, any semblance of preaching or of dogmatizing is avoided by Plato, and
the narrator appears just as little as he does in the History of Thucydides or
in Homer.” Therefore, for Hegel, it is superfluous to ask what belongs to
Socrates and what really belongs to Plato, since the aim of these dialogues is
not merely to showcase a variety of different philosophies, but to see them in
a dialectical interplay, which for Hegel produces results, (whether negative or
positive), to what knowledge is. Different positions are not annihilated or
simply negated (as say Karl Popper's conception of scientific theories), but
absorbed into a deeper conception, freeing them from their previously one-sided
character: “Thus in Plato’s philosophy we see all manner of philosophic
teaching from earlier times absorbed into a deeper principle, and therein
united. It is in this way that Plato’s philosophy shows itself to be a totality
of ideas: therefore, as the result, the principles of others are comprehended
in itself.” Hegel claims that the unity of difference (the communion of the
forms) is the crowning achievement of Plato's philosophy: “This union of what
is different, of Being and non-being, of one and many, etc., which takes place
without a mere transition from one to another, constitutes the inmost reality
and true greatness of Platonic philosophy” (68). Further, it is the dialectical
movement within concepts themselves that gives way to a higher understanding.
However,
there obviously remain exegetical difficulties that present problems
overlapping with Hegel's speculative concerns-- or, less narrowly, for Plato
scholars in general. Simply because of the nature of Plato’s mode of
representation (the dialogue format), there will be a deficiency in
determining the concrete form of Plato’s philosophy itself. This explains the
abundant commentaries attempting to dissect what Plato “really” thought. Hegel
admits that the dialogues present a challenge to understanding Plato’s
philosophy, since they do not put forth his thought in a systematic form.
In the dialogues, ideas are conveyed in many-sided ways through different
characters. However, Hegel insists that the content of Plato’s thought
can be grasped as a unitary whole, even if we moderns do not have the direct
oral discourses of Plato (as, for example, the work “Concerning the Good”
Aristotle seemed to have before him).
It
is true that The Sophist closes in on what a robust conception of Being
might look like; however, the dialogue never manages to entirely embrace the
whole. It mostly hints at it. Often times, in Plato's writings, issues are
rendered in a confusing manner. Hegel writes of Plato that “he did not show
sufficiently clearly how they are distinguished from the purely dialectical
knowledge which is in the Notion” (63). In other words, popular [common sense]
and more technical ideas jumble together, and certain issues are made more
mysterious than is proper to the dialectic. What we have are fragments (though
essential fragments) that descry a whole expressed “pictorially”: through
myths, dreams, spontaneous imaginative flights (of Socratic madness). While
these might help to express more speculative truths, these truths in some of
the dialogues are not grasped speculatively, and thus they suffer from Plato’s presentation,
as “the source of misapprehensions.” Hegel writes, “The myth belongs to the
pedagogic stage of the human race, since it entices and allures men to occupy
themselves with the content; but as it takes away from the purity of thought
through sensuous forms, it cannot express the meaning of Thought.” In other
words, Myths are only useful to teach a substantial point. Hegel writes
further, “When the Notion attains its full development, it has no more need of
the myth.”
As
a consequence of his method, Hegel wants to avoid the excess of the neo-Platonists
by reading “too much” into Plato, while criticizing the moderns for reading
“too little” and dismissing Plato as a mere mystagogue. For Hegel, Plato offers
the modern with a conceptual-theoretical surplus that philosophy cannot afford
to dispense with. Now that we have given a broad outline of how Hegel intends
to read Plato, it is worth turning to his specific reading of the Sophist.
In
Plato's Theaetetus, the central philosophical concern is with motion.
When we move to the Sophist, the concern is different. Parmenides
conception of absolute being rules out any discussion about change, flux, or
motion. One can only talk about “what is.” However, the problem with the
Parmenidean doctrine is this: if one may only speak of Being – deprived of definite
qualities or characteristics (because these undergo change) – except for the
fact that Being is, then Being is transformed into its opposite: a pure
void or nothing. Therefore, in order to show “what is” in contrast to “what is
not,” the Eleatic Stranger must set out, by his own admission, to kill his
Father Parmenides. The Stranger will have to torture Parmenides' conception of
pure Being by putting it through the fire of reason, so to speak. Only after
the Stranger has committed parricide, may one speak of “what is not,” and what
lies between being and non-being. The Eleatic Stranger is fully aware that the
Goddess of Parmenides Proem has forbidden precisely this. Thus, the Stranger's
attempt to show the validity of absolute Being will force him into a position
of heterodox Parmenideanism (a more pluralistic account of Being). The Stranger
will have to refute Parmenedian orthodoxy by showing that non-being has some
degree of existence.
The
Eleatic Stranger states that it is the business of dialectics to “divide
rightly…to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many
different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit
together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms,
existing only in separation and isolation.” Hegel argues that through the
Eleatic Stranger, Plato proves the existence of “non-being” but only as part of
a higher unity of Being, hence synthesizing Parmenides with Heraclitus. It is
through this synthesis that Plato can overcome the sophists, who cannot “get
beyond non-being.” The sophists are thereby refuted, since their entire
principle of “non-being” is shown to depend on a unity between the one and the
many.
Hegel sees a critique of treating Plato’s Forms as
“abstract universals” in the discussion criticizing the “friends of the
Forms.” Since the “friends of the Forms”
treat Being and Becoming as strictly separate matters, the problem of
interaction is raised: namely how can one have intercourse with the Forms
through the act of knowing, which itself belongs in the realm of becoming (with
life, soul, and other forms of movement)? The Stranger states, “Are we really
to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding have no place
in that which is perfectly real—that it has neither life nor thought, but
stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence?” (248E).
In the Sophist
it is demonstrated that Being and non-being are “applicable to all things; for
because things are different, the one being the other of the other, the
determination of the negative is present.” Hegel believes Plato realizes that
treating the Forms as abstract universals “could not endure” because this would
be opposed to the type of unity the Forms were to explain in the first place.
From refuting the doctrines of sensuous motion, Plato winds up refuting “even
the Ideas themselves” (or a certain conception of the Ideas).
For Hegel, the Platonic dialectic is at war with two
seemingly different things: it is against crude materialism that treats motion
as primary, and against the abstract universalism of the Parmenideans. However,
this war is waged not to annihilate these distinct positions, but to synthesize
them into a greater unity. For Hegel, Plato’s obscurity presents a problem of
what purely dialectical knowledge looks like, and without that account, Plato
is in danger of reverting back to a “negative dialectic” akin to the second
half of the Parmenides,
where we find an unending play between unity and multiplicity. Nonetheless,
Plato remains aware of this problem, and is critical of that variety of
negative dialectic: “If anyone thinks he has made a wonderful discovery in
ascertaining that he can drag thoughts this way and that, from one
determination to another, he may be told that he has done nothing worthy of
praise, for in so doing there is nothing excellent or difficult.”
In Plato’s critique of the “negative dialectic” of empty
refutation, that anything can be refuted by any other view, he points to the
limits of the sophists. As Hegel remarks in Philosophy of Right about Platonic irony in the
character of Socrates, what ultimately separates Socrates from the sophists is
his commitment to truth, with Socrates only using irony as a tool for defending
his commitment “against the conceit of the Sophists and the uneducated.” For
Socrates and Plato as read by Hegel, there is a tension between the finite and
the infinite that is ignored by the sophists (and their reincarnations in the
German romantics of Hegel’s day). Further, and compatible with Hegel’s point
about Platonic irony, the Eleatic Stranger, aware that Socrates may look like a
sophistical wolf in his art of dialectic, still insists that looks can be
deceiving. For the dialogues present the Socratic elenchus as not interested in mere contradiction,
but the pursuit of knowledge.
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