Gods and Giants: The Problem of Non-being in Plato's Sophist

In Plato's Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger sets out along with Theaetetus to disclose the Sophist. Socrates puts the first important question to the Stranger: are the sophist, statesman, and philosopher one, two, or three kinds? The Stranger responds that they are three; albeit he tells us that is is a complicated task to clarify the distinctions. At first glance, this does not seem to be worth much consideration. However, it is worth noting that the Stranger is a follower of his “father” Parmenides, who upheld that all being is one. In his poem, Parmenides states, “And it all is one to me” (6). Already by the Stranger's answer it is intimated that he may have substantial differences with Parmenides. The Stranger thinks that what he must argue may look like an attempt to kill his father, figuratively speaking (241d). Socrates, too, is a follower of Parmenides. Socrates believes that that which truly is, are things that are not coming into existence or fading out of existence but always remain eternally unchanging and static.

            In section 236E, The Eleatic Stranger lays out the problem of non-being. The problem is this: If person x speaks falsely, then person x is speaking of that which is not. To speak truly is to speak of something that is, whereas to speak falsely is to speak of something that is not. Earlier in the dialogue, the Stranger agrees with Parmenides to speak of only that which is; however, to pursue the concept of the Sophist, he must do what Parmenides forbids: to follow the path of that which is not. Parmenides in his poem writes, "This should not ever prevail in your thought: that the things that are not, are; Rather... keep your mind well shut off from just this way in searching." The Stranger has upheld that non-being is unthinkable and uncommunicable. He goes on to state, “And yet just a little while ago, I claimed: It is unutterable and unspeakable and irrational.” (238E). The key word here is “is.” simply by virtue of speaking about non-being, the Stranger presupposes that non-being is, and specifically that is a unity or “one” (otherwise, he would say non-beings). If non-being is not, how then could the Stranger know if it is one or many?

            Here is one possible way to parse out the problem of non-being:

A) That which is not – or does not exist – cannot be thought or spoken of (238c).

B) Yet, every utterance about non-being, even if speaking about what the concept is not (negative assertions), requires that one speak about what non-being is (238E).

C) Consequently, by claiming that non-being is unspeakable and unthinkable, the stranger is contradicting himself.

D) Thus, claiming that non-being is not speakable is tantamount to claiming that it is unspeakable. In a more general sense, to claim that “non-being is not” is the same as claiming that “non-being is non-being”-- this goes against the grain of what was previously asserted (unspeakability + nonexistence of non-being).

E) Therefore, by making these assertions about non-being, the Stranger tacitly affirms the opposite of what it was asserted in the first place.

            The Stranger's discussion of being and Non-being takes place against a backdrop of previous conversations from different schools of thought. It seems to me that these schools are divided and discussed in this way: first, the Stranger discusses the pluralists (it appears that the dualists are subsumed under this category, though this is probably open to interpretation) and monists. Second, he discusses  the materialists (giants) and idealists (friends of the forms or Gods).

            The Stranger speaks of the Monists when he writes,  “the Eleatic tribe in our regions, starting from Xenophanes and even before that, explains in stories that 'all things,' as they are called, are in fact one” (242d). In other words, the Monists think that reality or being is fundamentally unified, whole, or one. I think we would place Parmenides in this camp. The Stranger points to a conundrum with the Monists, “it's ridiculous for the man who posits nothing but one to agree that two names are” (244c). The argument seems to be that by using a name to designate an object, the monist is committing violence against his own position that all of being is one. Either the term we use designates something else, or is simply self-same (designating the word itself). If it is the first (that every reference refers to some thing other than itself), then it seems hard to maintain that being is fundamentally one. The Stranger speaks of the Dualist, “who says the beings are two” (hot and cold, wet and dry). For the pluralists, reality or being is divided into many different areas. The dualists hold that it is divided into two.

            The second pair (Giants vs. Gods) are locked in an unrelenting battle. Each stands at the opposite pole, with seemingly contradictory views. Their struggle cannot come into relief. We are told that the Gods won the battle through their arguments. According to the Stranger the materialists are uncompromisingly dogmatic in their position, and tend to ignore whatever their opponents have to say. The Materialists are hard and manly; whereas the friends of the forms are gentle and easy to converse with. Though both the Giants and Gods are engaged in battle, there doesn't seem to be a dialogue going on between them. For this reason, the Stranger takes up a third position by trying to understand the arguments made by both sides and bring them into dialogue, since each camp seem unable to do this themselves.

            The giants or materialists believe that everything is body or matter that can be perceived through the senses. Perhaps today we would call this group “empiricists.” According to the stranger, as his argument goes, the giants bring what is high low, and elevate what is low. The materialists reduce invisible divine things to tangible bodily things.

            Friends of the forms (Socrates) argue that there is a strict divide between the static, eternal beings that are rationally intelligible and the sensuous, fluctuating things that are not understandable. This group believes that ideas, forms, or invisible heavenly essences are what is most real.

            The stranger argues that the friends of the forms are at an impasse because of their allegiance to the unchanging static forms. He premises this argument on the notion that they are unable to provide an account of their own thinking or soul because both of these involve motion, which the belief in the view that contemplating the forms is the true path to knowledge denies. The Stranger concludes that the Friends of the forms cannot achieve self-knowledge, nor knowledge of things. But the case is also the same with the materialists, who cannot account for soul or intelligence. Thus the true philosopher, according to the Stranger, will have to go beyond both.