Hegel presupposed that the readers of his day were
familiar with what he calls the “method of science” which was developed in his
works Logic and Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (Hegel 1; 36). One cannot
understand Hegel's Philosophy of Right without
first understanding the method that guides the work. One must notice that it is
not “a” method, but the method. In
Hegel's view, the nature of reality is contradictory, dynamic, and fluid. But
from the chaos and flux of reality, the underlying laws can be discovered and
understood. There are an extraordinary amount of places where this can be seen.
One such example of this is the economic sphere. Hegel writes, “Political
economy is the science that starts from this standpoint; it's task is to
exhibit the mass-relationships and mass-movements in their qualitative and
quantitative determinacy and complexity” (Hegel 152). Hegel attempts to explain
the developments of mediations (the resolving of tensions, differences, and
conflicts), which are absolutely essential for an individual consciousness to
identify itself within the totality of civil society. Within the Philosophy of Right, Hegel is concerned
with freedom in the realm of what he calls “objective Geist,” or the sphere of abstract right, morality, civil society,
and the state. One of Hegel's goals is to develop a conception of freedom which
pays proper attention to the structure of the will. What lies at the heart of
Hegel's thought and binds the extremely broad range of topics discussed in the Philosophy of Right is the concept of
freedom. But what precisely is freedom according to Hegel?
Hegel
does not adopt a single procedure when dealing with concepts and for this
reason it is hard to pin down a distinct, concise definition of the word “freedom”. There
isn’t a schema or method one can find. There is
no “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” as one
is commonly told. Hegel even warns us against this in the preface. Hegel
rejects this manner of proceeding. Speculative thought (the name Hegel gives
his own philosophy), though it may make use of, does not proceed by setting up
definitions or propositions and defending them through formal argument or
supporting evidence (Hegel 12). This is not to say you won’t find
arguments or evidence, but this can’t be
the only way thinking takes place. Instead it seeks to understand and express
the immanent development of the concepts which it analyses. Therefore when
dealing with political and social freedom, the goal of speculative thought is
not to argue for or against definite accounts of freedom, or critique them from
an external perspective (for instance, from the perspective of the state), but
rather to simply develop the idea of freedom itself, or as Hegel puts it, “it must
observe the subject matter's own immanent development” (Hegel
12).
Hegel's
system of dialectical thought attempts to grasp the inherent process of
development of concepts on its own terms. There is an inner evolution and an
inner content that follows its own logic. Each philosophical position can be
shown as incoherent on its own terms and by its own standards simply by
thinking through the matter. Then what is true can be elevated and preserved in
the next position, which will also inevitably be worked through. Hegel states, “dialectic
then is not the external doing of subjective thinking, but rather the content's
very soul organically putting forth its branches and fruit” (Hegel
36). The dialectical method is not merely a matter of subjective critique, nor
is it merely a matter of pasting our own rationality onto the way things are,
but rather of understanding a theory's own laws as they develop like a seedling
becoming a plant or DNA becoming a living organism. Hegel’s “method” isn’t
really a method at all, but the unfolding of thinking itself. For this reason,
Hegel does not attempt to discredit adverse philosophical positions by using his own external terms and standards – which
would not be recognized by the opponent – but rather
the key to refuting a position lies in revealing the inner criteria by which
the truth of a position is judged and then showing how that very position fails
measure up to its own standards. Dialectical thought is concerned with
explicating what is actually rational within the movement of things as they are
in themselves, i.e. the dialectical method is one of internal refutation and
expansion.
However,
merely positing contradictions, dichotomies, and antimonies does not go deep or
far enough-- it is a negative critique, a half-measure. Hegel contrasts his
method to Plato's dialectic (the Socratic method), which would often take an
opponent's immediate, unthought out proposition or statement and twist it
around until it imploded. Hegel states that his method is contrary to the one
which takes a viewpoint and “dissolves
it, confuses it, pursues it this way and that, and has as its sole task the
deduction of the contrary from what it starts with” (Hegel
36). Hegel's “higher”
dialectic goes beyond simply pointing out tensions and contradictions by
showing the way contradictions get resolved, by showing the immanent results
and positive content of a concept. Thought, for Hegel, must think through the
contradictions in its categories and revolve them. Unlike other philosophers,
Hegel does not merely present arguments, counter-arguments and conclusions, but
rather attempts to uncover the emergence of the tensions and limitations within
an explanation or theory until it gives way to a deeper understanding which is
able to overcome contradictions by both preserving and canceling what is
negative within a concept. Hegel's speculative method can be seen in his
discussion of the will, which unfolds in three essential stages or moments. The
will, and with it the development of freedom, moves from the universal, into the particular, and finally the individual.
The
universal will is characterized by
the capacity to abstract from all
desires, impulses, and inclinations and satisfy none of them. This first moment
of the will tarrying towards its freedom involves what Hegel calls “pure
indeterminacy” of the self, or as Hegel
explains, the “absolute possibility of my
abstracting from every determination within which I find myself or which I may
have posited within myself, the flight from all content as restrictive” (Hegel
20). This type of freedom is completely negative and primitive, but it also
distinguishes humans from animals; it entails not being tied down to any
particular frame of mind or desire, but rather having the ability to sever
oneself from any particular engagement and remain free from the constraints and
limitations of definite activities and particular courses of action. The
universal will posits the infinite; thus it does not make choices because it
would then be stuck in finitude. Hegel identified this form of freedom in the examples of suicide, mysticism, and
the Terror of the French Revolution.
The
particular will not only abstracts,
but reflects on desires, impulses,
and inclinations to figure out which one it will choose in order to determine, clarify, or orient itself towards a
particular course of action. Even in the common, everyday understanding,
freedom does not solely mean not being weighed down or restricted; it also
involves the positive ability to engage in particular actions if one wants to
do so. The second stage of freedom (particular
will) also contains the ability to accede into a definite state of mind or
activity and to concern oneself with something particular. The ability to
abstract from one's desires is an essential component in higher forms of
freedom. Since the particular will can
abstract from all of its desires, it's not fettered (like an animal) to act on
anyone of them (even the strongest desires)-- thus the particular will is free
to pick and choose between them. Hegel argues that this is usually what is
meant by “freedom of the will” (as
found Kant and Fitche, for instance). This stage of the will is immediate and
natural, but it is also unsatisfactory for the following reasons: first, the
will is dependent for its content on a range of options that are simply given
to it, that it is “thrown” into.
For instance, I am free to choose which of my desires to fulfill or act upon,
but I do not choose what desires I have in the first place. Second, none of
these options is an appropriate object of the will, since while the will is
universal each of its potential objects is merely particular-- if the will is
content and satisfied with just one of them, the will won't fulfill its
concept. Even if the will aims, not at the satisfaction of a current desire,
but at its long term happiness, the content of its happiness still depends on
the content of particular desires that are simply given to it.
The
individual will is the auhfeben or sublation of both previous
stages of the will. In exercising its freedom to partake in particular
endeavors, the will must still preserve its freedom to withdraw from them, if
the will is to remain free in the initial, negative sense. The individual will overcomes the problems
and contradictions by willing itself or
willing freedom, thus generating from its own resources (immanently) an object
that is, like itself, universal. The individual will is conceived as a
combination of the first and second stages of freedom; in other words, the
third moment of freedom is a unity of opposites (of the first two moments): the
freedom to choose and engage in some particular end, while simultaneously
preserving the awareness that one is not irreversibly bound to that end, because
one has chosen it oneself and so could remove oneself from it and engage in
some other activity is one felt inclined to do so. The individual will is a restoration of universality out of
particularity. When constructed in this manner, freedom involves the ability to
make commitments, while also keeping
one's options open. In this final stage, the will is entirely free
because it has itself as its object and is wholly self-contained. This is a
fairly common notion of freedom held by most people: freedom as the protecting
of one's possibilities and capacities when confronted by whatever commitments
one may make, freedom as the ability to choose and do as one pleases (Hegel
21-3).
Hegel
is highly critical of this view of view of freedom. He, however, does not
criticize it from a presupposed view of the good or of what designates a just,
ethical, or responsible life. Instead, he thinks through the implications of
this conception of freedom and comes across a contradiction within it. The
aforementioned mode of freedom lies, as Hegel explains, not in being “bound
to this or that specific content”, in
not being required to choose or do anything (Hegel 27). Individuals may be
confronted by seemingly unavoidable needs (for instance, the need to eat, rest,
or work for a living), but they may believe themselves to be free if they are
not actually coerced into any particular course of activity, but could, for
instance, refuse to sleep or eat. When looking at freedom from this
perspective, the fact that an individual is free does not bring with it any
necessary commitments or obligations of its own. An individual must certainly
choose something if his freedom is to be a real freedom to choose, but he does
not consider that he is committed to any specific course of activity simply by
virtue of the fact that he is free-- because he considers his freedom to be
nothing other than the ability to withdraw or disengage himself from any
particular commitment which he has made.
An
individual can thus only maintain his freedom of choice if he considers the
options which he is able to choose, or reject, to be distinct and external from
him, i.e. to be activities or interests which do not follow from his freedom
itself. In Hegel's understanding, this is where the inherent contradiction in
this account of freedom becomes obvious. For if one wishes to maintain the
sense that one's freedom lies in facing a set of options to which, as a free
individual, one is not necessarily committed, then the following question needs
to be asked: if it is not from one's own freedom itself, then what determines
the options among which one has choose from? The only answer seems to be that
those options are determined by factors other than one's free will (chance,
nature, etc.), and that they are given to an individual to choose from or
reject. But if this is the situation, then one's freedom is subsistent upon
what is available to be chosen. Furthermore, by insisting that freedom lies in
being able to choose whatever one wants, one limits oneself to and makes
oneself dependent on whatever one happens to want or wish for at that moment (a
subjective basis), i.e. whatever one's particular desires happen to be or
whatever one's circumstances lead one to desire. Hegel is pointing out that
what is perceived as autonomous is actually heteronomous. It is obvious,
therefore, that when one lays claim to unbridled freedom of choice, one is not
actually a free as one thinks they are, since one's commitments are not derived
from one's free will itself, and thus are not determined by one's own free
will. Hegel writes, “Typical
human beings believe that they are free when they are allowed to act willfully
[based on subjective whim – P.G.],
but it follows from their willfulness that they are not free” (Hegel
28). This is the case because the content of my will – what I
will – is not “determined
to be mine by the nature of my will, but rather by some contingency” and is
not “adequate to me; it is therefore separate
from me” (Hegel 28). Freedom of this
kind is therefore “dependence on a content and
material given either from within or from without” (Hegel
27).
It
is only when the will is no longer dependent on something given to it that this
contradiction can be resolved. The will gains independence when what it wills
is determined by itself-- not by external or internal contingencies. But what
content does the free will determine by itself? What commitments or duties
become apparent simply by the fact that one is-- and is self-aware that one
is-- a free will? We can see the answer to this question if we think about what
the will is attempting to uphold and realize by exercising its freedom. When
one chooses a specific course of activity one obviously wills whatever it is
that one chooses; yet, by holding the view that one is not irreversibly bound
to the choice, it becomes clear that one is not interested solely in a specific
option, but more fundamentally in preserving one's freedom to choose. Whatever
particular commitments one makes a
primary concern – insofar as one seeks to
uphold the possibility of other, different options or choices – is to
protect and exercise one's freedom itself. The content that any free will wills
simply by virtue of being free is therefore nothing other than its own freedom.
To the extent that the free will wills its own
freedom, it is a truly free will. This
is because it wills a content which is inherent in autonomous activities
itself, and thus is not subservient on a group of contents which are given to
it to choose between. Hegel explains, “the
absolute determination or, if you like, the absolute drive of free spirit is to
make its freedom its object” (Hegel
34). Therefore, real freedom is found not merely in doing or choosing what one
wishes, but in being “the
free will that wills the free will” (Hegel
34).
When
Hegel uses the phrase “the
free will that wills itself” he
does not mean the exact same thing as Kant: that the will generates rules for
its content by a priori rational thinking. Instead, Hegel means the following:
the will – like Kant's thinking self --
is essentially rational. However, a better counter part to this rationality is
found, not in impulses and inclinations which come and go as they please, but
in the structure of ethical life, which imbues the system of rationality that
forms the core (the content) of the self. The institutions of ethical life
overcome the disparity between reason and inclinations postulated by Kant.
Inclinations are transformed into the rights and duties connected to social
roles and are therefore imbued with rationality. For instance, sexual urges are
channeled into marriage, hunger is satisfied at organized meals, and
intellectual curiosity is channeled into universities. In this sense, we win
liberation from our desires and inclinations not by repressing or disregarding
them, but by satisfying them in a cultivated, socially acceptable manner, i.e.
by existing in a society. We are then not simply fulfilling our subjective
whims, but working for the maintenance of the whole of the state and its
society, and its subsidiary institutions. To use an analogy, it is not that
each of us is playing our own tune, rather each of us is part of an orchestra.
The key to solving the contradiction of the will, between reason and desire, is
the sociality of our being. Moreover, the will and its freedom form a bridge
between society and the individual.
Like
Kant, Hegel believes the truly free will to be the will that wills itself and
its own freedom. He explicates this conception of true freedom from the
structure of freedom of choice. As we have seen, Hegel's analysis developed
immanently, dialectically from choice into a new conception of freedom. The
will that wants to be able to choose whatever it wants must aim to preserve its
own freedom to choose, even though it thinks of its freedom as the lack of
necessity or constraint. Nonetheless, the will that is explicitly and
consciously free notes that freedom is something which it must will because it
is free, and thus ceases to insist on the priority of its own freedom to
choose. This kind of will is no longer dependent for its content or object upon
external, contingent factors, but wills a content (freedom) which is derived
from the self and is thus completely its own. But, oddly enough, it only gains
its freedom through its conformability and willingness to give up its unlimited
ability to choose, and let itself become determined by the nature of its own
freedom.
The
truly free will conceives of freedom as something to which it is necessarily
invested in and committed to, something which therefore commands the
recognition of any free will by necessity. When looked at in this sense,
freedom is an issue of simple and immediate right (Hegel 34-5). Hegel's
conception of freedom turns out to be a philosophy of right, an exposition of
what the will must enforce if it is to be truly free.
Hegel's
conception of freedom, at first glance, might not appear to be much better than
the view of freedom as choice-- especially when reflecting on the notion that
one can insist on one's right to make a choice as much as any other right. What
is decisive for Hegel, though, is the distinction between the will which views
freedom merely in terms of choice and the will which views freedom as a matter
of right in itself, importantly that the latter understands that freedom itself
entails necessary commitments, obligations, and responsibilities that develop
immanently from the nature of freedom itself, and from which, as a free will,
it cannot choose to withdraw itself without denying its own freedom. In Hegel's
philosophy of freedom then there is put forward a view where the distinction
between necessity and constraint melts away. The truly free will does not
acknowledge the requirement that it recognize rights and laws as a restriction
on its freedom, but rather as a necessary condition for its freedom. The free
will is self-aware that its obligations are derived from itself, i.e. it is a
self-determining, self-legislating, autonomous being. The free will is both
determined and self-determining.
Works Cited
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