159, p. 1 – Marx first critically reviewed Hegelian
philosophy of law in 1844 in Paris, his results were published in the newspaper
Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher. His review of Hegelian philosophy led
him to realize that laws aren't to be understood as coming into being by their
own accord or as the development of the human mind in general (Hegel's Geist or
absolute spirit), but laws have their basis in real life, the material
conditions of life. Hegel, following the 18th century French and
English economists, called this “civil society.” The structure of civil society, for
Marx, is to be found by examining political economy, or economics. Marx was
forced into exile by the French statesman Guizot, and had to continue his
studies in Brussels, where he ended up arriving at the general thrust of his
critique, which became the guiding idea of his work. The main thrust is that
when it comes to social production, humans
enter into predetermined relations that aren't of their choosing. The
relations reflect the development of the material economic forces at a given
stage of production. The totality of these relations of production is the
economic structure, the basis, of society. On this economic basis arises the
“super structure,” that is, things like laws, morality, ideologies, etc.
160 – It's the economic system which shapes social and
political attitudes, philosophies, theories, and ideologies, etc. of man. It's
not man's attitudes or consciousness that decides what kind of existence he'll
have. It's not man's ideas about the world that determines how the world is,
but the world and man's social existence in it, that determines the way man
thinks about the world. At certain stages, economic productive forces outgrow
the legal frame works which legitimized those very productive forces and the
relations which correspond to them. Thus laws which at one time allowed
productive forces to develop and benefit humanity, now become chains holding
back the development of the productive forces of society. It's at this time
that economic tensions become unbearable and revolutions happen, thus leading
to the reorganization of the economic foundations of life, and consequently the
ideas, etc. of a society. There is a distinction between the material
transformation of the economic context of production (the root, basis, or
actual framework of society), which Marx thinks can be understood
scientifically, and the superstructural (the legal, political, ideological,
philosophical, religious, aesthetics, etc.) aspects of society, which is where
economic tensions and contradictions find expression and are fought out.
161 – To look at history very broadly, there are the
Asiatic, Ancient, Feudal, and Bourgeois modes of production. Each epoch was
progressive at one time, but eventually turning into its opposite (reactionary)
necessitated revolution. History has been a progressive development, where the
contradictions of each society have become more and more simplified with the development
of each higher epoch. Now, today, with the bourgeois epoch there exist the
actual material foundations to get rid of the economic contradictions that
marred all past epochs. For Marx, all history up until now has been brutish; it
has merely been man's prehistory.
p. 2 – Marx and Engels arrived at very similar conclusions,
and decided to work together in order to clarify their own views. They ended up
going over and critiquing German philosophy (in particular, Young Hegelian
philosophy). They ended up writing two books, but basically the books were
never published and were thrown in a chest in some dingy basement (until they
were recovered in the 1930s posthumously and published as the economic and
philosophical manuscripts of 1844, and the German Ideology). Marx
and Engels weren't too concerned that their book wasn't published because they
were just trying to clear things up for themselves.
169 – Ideas (consciousness) and concepts are at the
beginning stages directly interconnected with material economic activity
between people. At this stage, ideas seem to directly flow from material
behavior (for instance, in hunter gather societies, most myths and stories
reflect the organization of that society, thus we get stories about wolf-gods,
and whatnot). It's real men – historically situated in definite economic modes
of production – who make their ideas. At a certain point, ideologies flip this
relation, making it seem as if ideas made man (God, for instance).
p. 2 – Marx's method is opposed to German philosophy
(specifically, German idealism), which begins a priori (descending from
heaven to earth), believing thinking determines reality, as opposed to reality
determining thinking. Marx's method is materialist, that is, it starts from
real life, which ideas develop out of. Thus Marx's starting point is a
posterori, but he is different than the empiricists, because his thinking
is dialectical, it grasps the developmental and fluid nature of reality, as
opposed to empiricism, which makes dead, static abstractions from “facts about
reality.”
170 – Thus, there is no longer a chasm between forms of
thinking (ideology, philosophy, consciousness, etc.) and empirical reality.
Both are dialectically connected, the ideological arising out of the material.
Thus material reality is primary.
p. 2 – Marx's method does not try to start out from pure,
abstract thought emptied of all particular content, but from the real premises
of material reality: of men as they actually exist, not in abstract isolation
or definition, but from the real conditions men are born into. Marx's method is
a synthesis of empiricism and idealism, an aufhebung, if you will.
p. 3 – German idealism is a lot of hot air about ideas and
concepts that have no actual existence outside of the minds of a handful of
philosophers. We should be looking at real history, and our abstractions should
be drawn from this material. When we do this though, philosophy no longer
becomes an independent branch cut off from reality. Abstract systems of thought
in themselves have no value. It's only when thought is capable of actually
grasping reality, and changing it, that it becomes useful.
171 – German philosophers like Kant and Hegel wanted pure, a
priori philosophy, and thus don't postulate starting premises about human
existence. Marx thinks this is absurd. Before man can make history, or think up
elaborate philosophies, he must meet his material needs: eating, drinking,
gaining access to clothing, shelter, and sexual reproduction, etc. Thus, the
first premise for Marx is a historical one. Man must first meet his material
needs before there can be history as such, and thus the production of material
life is a fundamental condition of history. This is the most basic and
fundamental fact about human history; it is extremely significant, and from it
flows a number of implications. The German idealists have failed to grasp the
significance of this presupposition of human existence. The French and English
philosophers and political economists grasped it, but in a one-sided, and
limited manner.
172 – The second fundamental point is that after needs are
met on a stable basis, new needs arise. The German's ended up making up a bunch
of rubbish about prehistory, in order to speculate about human nature and knock
down straw man arguments.
p. 2 – The third circumstance, at the very bottom of
history, is that mankind needs to reproduce itself sexually. Thus humans
necessarily enter into definite social relations (family, tribes, etc.), if
they did not then the human race would not exist. (This pulls the rug out from
solipsistic theories of individual, self-sufficient men). Marx is going to base
his analysis off actual empirical data about the way people have existed, not
“the concept of the family.”
173 – The above outlined three circumstances necessary for
human history are not to be taken alone in isolation, but together as three
aspects of a whole. All are necessary for humans to even exist throughout time.
p. 2 – The production of life (sexually and through labor)
has a double relationship: it is both natural and social. Man cannot exist in
isolation; he is a social creature by necessity under all conditions; fables
about isolated individuals on deserted islands have absolutely no basis in
reality; they're merely idiotic fancies used to justify the narrow,
unenlightened self-interest of competition found in definite forms of society.
From this it follows that all modes of production are various forms of social
co-operation. When studying history, we must always examine the economic and
material ground upon which the higher forms of consciousness, ideologies,
philosophies, religions, arts, etc. rest. It is not merely enough to only examine
the economic ground, the superstructure too must be analyzed, lest analysis
will make the same mistakes of the one-sided empiricists.
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